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EXCESSIVE USE OF DEADLY FORCE BY POLICE IN THE PHILIPPINES 
BEFORE DUTERTE 
 
 
Abstract: Under President Duterte the Philippine National Police have killed several 
thousand suspects in so-called legitimate encounters. While this has engendered much 
media attention and scientific research, earlier police violence is still a black-box in 
many respects. This article provides at least a partial filling of this void. It establishes 
several indicators for measuring lethal police violence. Moreover, it presents a detailed 
mapping of regional and sub-regional patterns of armed police encounters for the 
decade from 2006 to 2015. The spatial and temporal comparisons show that even 
though actual levels of deadly police violence have been quite low in several Philippine 
provinces and cities, the Philippine National Police almost always shot to kill suspects 
and not to incapacitate them. While there was significant variation over time and 
between sub-national units, neither the magnitude nor the levels of lethality of the 
violence are related to the threat levels to which the police officers were exposed. 
 
Key words: extra-legal killing, extra-judicial execution, fatal police violence, 
police vigilantism 
 
Since Rodrigo Duterte became President of the Philippines on June 30, 2016 the 
Philippines have made global headlines for waging a relentless war on drugs that has 
cost the lives of several thousand people. One prominent segment of this campaign has 
been the active involvement of the Philippine National Police (PNP), who killed more 
than 3,000 people in the first year of the Duterte presidency in the context of so-called 
legitimate encounters under the pretext of self-defence.  
Although lethal police violence under Duterte has engendered a significant 
amount of research, police practices in the past have remained woefully under-
researched. Currently, we neither know how many civilians have been killed and 
wounded by the police nor do we know the extent and patterns of sub-national and 
temporal variation of such killings. Lacking appropriate data, it is also impossible to 
compare the Philippines with other countries.  
This article introduces a new dataset [https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8JXQCG] 
that fills this void. It presents the first results of a mapping of fatal and non-fatal police 
violence in the context of “legitimate” armed encounters between the PNP and 
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suspected criminals in 43 sub-regional units for the last decade of Philippine 
“normalcy” from 2006 to 2015.  
This makes it possible to assess the validity of explanations provided by existing 
studies on Philippine police violence that draw on and generalise from qualitative 
knowledge of a small number of prominent cases of Duterte and pre-Duterte police 
violence. These studies explain fatal police violence through generalised patterns such 
as organisational culture, a fit between police practice and public expectations and 
norms that view fatal police violence as an acceptable “form of informal or street 
punishment for breaking the law” in the light of a “dysfunctional criminal justice 
system,” or as an integral part of the everyday practice of a “police force accustomed to 
extortion and execution” (Coronel 2017, 187, 189). Others focus on the current killings 
of criminals as a specific “spectacle of violence” (Reyes 2016, 111) or “penal 
populism” (Curato 2016, 91), anchoring fatal violence against suspected criminals in 
practices and cultural expectations of social control that exclude criminals from the 
community and consequently from state protection in a way similar to the “homo sacer” 
in ancient Roman law (Reyes 2016).  
The almost exclusive focus on prominent cases does not permit assessment of 
whether these are representative of or aberrations from general patterns. As will be 
shown below, there has always been a huge variation in levels of police violence 
between sub-national units and within units over time that clearly limits the utility of 
relying on prominent cases. If general patterns – such as organisational culture – are to 
explain fatal police violence, they must be able to account for spatial and temporal 
variation.  
This study argues that the hard data on state-perpetrated violence that targets 
suspected criminals in the Philippines is still too insufficient to allow for a causal 
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analysis of factors that either inhibit or encourage such killings. In this respect, the 
Philippines is no exception in international comparisons. Except for a small number of 
countries, scientific knowledge about the particular practice at state or sub-state levels is 
almost non-existent (Osse and Cano 2017).  
Consequently, this article takes a step backwards. Instead of searching for causes 
of current and past fatal police violence, it confines itself to establishing a fairly detailed 
mapping of such fatal (and non-fatal) police violence for 26 provinces (Regions 3, 4a, 
4b, 7, 10) and the 17 component parts of the National Capital Region (NCR) of the 
Philippines for the decade from 2006 to 2015. Chosen were regions with extraordinarily 
high and low levels of killings by the police during the first year of the Duterte 
presidency (based on the ABS-CBN dataset). Independent cities that are economically 
tightly linked to the neighbouring province or serve as the provinces’ seats of 
government are included in the respective data for the provinces. The data were 
established through extensive online media search. Sources are from 27 national 
broadsheets and 38 regional and local news-outlets. Other datasets established by Fatal 
Encounters and the Washington Post on deadly police violence in the United States 
attest that such detailed online analysis of newspaper accounts provide a rather 
comprehensive picture of the actual situation. Reliability of the data is further supported 
by a comparison with the only available Philippine source, the news reports of the 
Bulacan provincial police. Our search netted 38 cases for 2015, only 2 short of the 40 
reported by the Bulacan provincial police (minus 5%; Bulacanpnp nd). 
The dataset establishes not only the number of encounters, of suspects killed and 
wounded for all encounters with the police, but also the corresponding numbers of 
police officers who became victims. It first operationalises three dimensions of police 
violence: its magnitude, the threat level experienced by the police and the lethality of 
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encounters. Following this, the spatial and temporal patterns of pre-Duterte police 
shoot-outs will discussed for the regional and sub-regional units encompassed in the 
dataset with respect to the three dimensions mentioned above. This provides answers to 
several hitherto open questions: How prevalent and uniform was fatal police violence in 
pre-Duterte Philippines? To what extent can the police legitimately argue that they 
killed in self-defence? What kind of temporal variation can be observed among the units 
involved? 
Throughout the paper the data established for the Philippines will be compared 
with the United States, Brazil, Mexico and Jamaica to allow a rough ranking of the 
“normal” pre-Duterte police practice in the Philippines.1  
 
MEASURING EXCESSIVE LETHAL POLICE VIOLENCE 
 
Any effort at establishing the extent to which lethal police violence is excessive has to 
differentiate between real self-defence, encounters, in which violence may have been 
excessive but was not employed intentionally in order to kill the suspects but to avert a 
subjectively perceived imminent threat (putative self-defence), and targeted killings. 
In the absence of trustworthy post-incident investigations, precise attribution of 
individual cases to these categories must remain the exception to the rule. However, 
given a sufficient number of cases, indicators can be established, through which 
legitimate use of force can be differentiated from targeted killings. They are derived 
from the legal framework legitimizing the application of force by the police worldwide. 
In the Philippines these are spelled out in the Philippine Police Manual: 
 
5 
 
During an armed confrontation, only such necessary and reasonable force 
should be applied as would be sufficient to overcome resistance put up by 
the offender; subdue the clear and imminent danger posed by him; or to 
justify the force/act under the principles of self defense, defense of 
relative, or defense of stranger.… The excessive use of force is prohibited. 
The use of weapon is justified if the suspect poses imminent danger of 
causing death or injury to the police officer or other persons.… Moreover, 
unlawful aggression should be present for self-defense to be considered as 
justifying circumstance (PNP 2010, 3). 
 
Surprisingly, there are no established scales for differentiating legitimate use of 
deadly force from excessive violence. The most systematic effort in this direction is 
Chevigny’s (1990, 1991, 1995) work on police deadly force in Jamaica, Brazil and 
Argentina. Chevigny proposed several indicators for establishing whether use of deadly 
force by the police has been excessive. Except for a recent study on Mexico by Correa, 
Forné and Rivas (2015) there have been hardly any efforts to follow the path towards 
the establishment of such an empirical foundation for intra- and international 
comparative research on police violence. Thus, both the development of indicators and 
the analysis of the Philippine cases must be understood as an exploration of a woefully 
under-researched field and as aimed at encouraging more research. In the following 
section, two indicators will be established for each of the three dimensions of 
magnitude, perceived threat and lethality.  
 
Magnitude of lethal force used by police 
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A straightforward measurement of the magnitude of the killing of suspects in police 
encounters is the number of suspects killed per million population by on-duty police 
officers. This scale parallels the common international measurement that is used to 
establish the severity of crime.  
To better reflect the nature of the environment in which police officers operate it 
is sensible to relate lethal police violence to levels of criminal violence. This ratio of 
suspects killed to criminal killings, in other words murder and intentional homicide, 
provides a second denominator for the magnitude of killings by the police. It takes 
account of the probable effect of variations of the perceived threat level of the 
environment in which police officers operate. 
 
Establishing the link between application of force and threat level 
 
While criminal killings per million population are a first indicator of the abstract threat 
to which on-duty police officers are exposed, a more direct indicator of perceived threat 
is the extent to which members of the police force have been victims in such encounters 
(Parent 2006; Jacobs and O’Brian 1998). This indicator assumes that police officers feel 
especially threatened when a high number of their colleagues has become victims. The 
indicator relates the number of police officers killed to the overall strength of the police 
force. 
 
Determining the lethality of the application of force by the police 
 
The core question, however, is the extent to which police-officers shoot in real or 
putative self-defence or resort to targeted killing. If we assume that police officers are 
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acting in self-defence according to regulations, then, given a sufficient number of cases, 
we should expect a certain number of killed or wounded among the police, too. For 
example, with 100 suspects but no police officer killed or wounded in encounters, it 
seems impossible that the vast majority of victims were killed in self-defence. This 
makes this ratio of suspects killed to police officers a strong indicator for or against 
targeted killings by the police. Chevigny (1990, 396) proposes that ratios of 15 suspects 
killed to each police officer killed clearly “suggest that deadly force may be employed 
for purposes other than the protection of life.” 
A second indicator for establishing the lethality of police violence focuses on the 
duty to apply only the minimum amount of violence necessary to subdue the threat. If 
the police do not shoot to kill, then we should expect a large number of suspects 
wounded as compared with a smaller number of suspects killed, at least when analyzing 
a large numbers of cases. Thus, an excessive number of suspects killed and low 
numbers of suspects wounded is a clear indication of police vigilantism. Chevigny 
(1990, 396) proposes that a ratio larger than one makes it sensible to argue “that deadly 
force may be excessive.” 
 
Indicators on lethal police application of force 
 
The above discussion leaves us with six indicators that allow for a fairly precise 
descriptive comparison of Philippine police practice with respect to armed encounters. 
(see Table 1).2  
 
ARMED POLICE ENCOUNTERS (2006–2015) 
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Taken together, the online media search of police encounters yielded a total of 882 
cases with 1,612 suspects killed and 86 wounded, as well as 40 police officers killed 
and 89 wounded in the period from January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2015. These are 
very unevenly distributed across the selected regions (see Table 2).  
 
Comparing magnitudes of lethal police violence  
 
At 161, the annual average number of suspects killed during the decade preceding the 
Duterte presidency was only a fraction of the number killed during Duterte’s first year. 
This number is lower than studies that rely on a small number of prominent cases would 
suggest. Extrapolated to the Philippines the data suggest that most probably fewer than 
300 suspects were killed by the PNP per year. This would be slightly fewer than the 
respective numbers for the United States. The datsets provided by Fatal Encounters, the 
Washington Post and the Guardian document approximately 1000 killings annually in 
recent years. This would approximate 310 killings for a population of 100 million. In 
contrast, the police of Jamaica killed 169 suspects annually during the period from 2011 
to 2017 (Independent Commission of Investigations, various reports). Adjusted for 
population this would amount to more than 6,000 police killings per year for the 
Philippines. Corresponding numbers for Brazil are between 2,000 and 3,000 fatal police 
encounters per year. Adjusted by population this would approximate. 1,000 to 1,500 
police killings, or three to five times the projected Philippine rate.  
The Philippine average, however, masks huge regional and sub-regional 
variation (see Table 3). In the NCR, 7.17 suspects per million population were killed 
annually during the 10-year period, whereas the corresponding numbers for Regions 4b 
and 10 are 0.07 and 0.05 respectively. Even a highly integrated megacity such as Metro 
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Manila (NCR) exhibits a dramatic level of variation. Not a single killing was recorded 
for the municipality of Pateros and San Juan City, and only an annual rate of 1.18 
killings per million population for Pasig City. The cities of Manila and Quezon 
exhibited almost identical rates of 14.5 killings per million population annually. These 
high levels of variation are replicated in all other high-violence regions (see Table 3). 
The regional ranking is unchanged when the number of killings is related to the 
number of criminal killings (see Table 4).3 In the NCR there are approximately eight 
criminal killings for one killing by the PNP, while in Region 10 there are only 0.03 
killings by the police for 10 criminal killings.  
A comparison with Brazil, Jamaica and the United states helps interpret these 
numbers in international comparison. If weighted against crime level, the extent of 
lethal Philippine police violence was high but not exceptional in international 
comparisons during the decade before Duterte. For Rio de Janeiro 9010 intentional 
violent deaths and 1519 killings resulting from police intervention were recorded from 
2010 to 2014. Police killings then stood at 16.86 times the number of criminal killings 
(AI 2015, 35; for detailed data see Bueno, Cerqueira and de Lima nd). For the United 
States, the FBI computed a total of 88,228 murders and non-negligent manslaughters for 
the period from 2006 to 2015, the database by Fatal Encounters (nd) shows a total sum 
of 5,654 police killings for the same period, that is, police killings accounted for 6.41% 
of criminal killings, which is 71% higher than the corresponding data for the Philippine 
sample. Put simply, if lethal crime is considered, Philippine police officers have been 
less inclined to resort to fatal violence during the past decade than their US 
counterparts.  
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Comparing threat levels  
 
In order to analyse whether regional variation in the Philippines can be attributed to 
variation in the threat level of the police environment the data on criminal killings can 
be related to the corresponding data on fatal police violence (both adjusted to per 
million population).  
If the perceived threat emanating from criminal killings were the core driving 
force of lethal police violence, then we would expect higher levels of lethal police 
violence in regions with higher levels of criminal killings. Quite surprisingly, however, 
the objectively measurable abstract threat (criminal killings per million population) is 
lowest in the two regions with by far the highest levels of police violence per million 
population (NCR, Reg. 3). It is highest in regions 7 and 10, which actually have 
comparably low or extraordinarily low levels of police encounter killings.  
Another perspective on threat perception focuses directly on the victims on the 
police side. Sub-national units with higher ratios of police officers killed relative to 
police strength should exhibit higher levels of lethal police violence. Yet, overall the 
number of police victims has been quite low (4 per year). NCR police officers and those 
in Region 4a clearly face the largest threat of being killed in shootouts, which is in line 
with the threat hypothesis. Despite this and contrary to expectations, the threat level in 
high police violence Region 3 did not exceed the one in low police violence Region 4b 
(see Table 6). 
A more detailed picture of the NCR component cities again shows no 
relationship between number of police officers killed and the propensity of the police to 
resort to lethal violence (see figure below). Actually, the two by far most populous 
cities of Manila and Quezon had low levels of police officers killed as a ratio of police 
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force, while exhibiting per capita killings of suspects that were almost 300% higher than 
those of the next highest cases (Pasig, Navotas), indicating more of an inverse 
relationship. The six units that had no reports of police officer killed between 2006 and 
2015 vary widely in terms of the ratios of suspects killed by the police. 
This qualitative impression is underlined by the Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient for the component units of the NCR that revealed only a weak and 
statistically insignificant correlation (rs=0.366; n=17; p=0.15). Despite some caveats on 
account of the disproportionate effect that may result from small numbers, it is safe to 
argue that differences with respect to the concrete threat of becoming a victim is not an 
important explanatory variable for the variation in fatal shootings by police officers. 
This is similar to the United States where a Spearman rank correlation coefficient also 
showed no correlation between police officers killed and strength of the police force and 
levels of homicide per 100,000 population (rs=0.211; n=51; p=0.14) at the state level. 
To sum up, the above analyses show no relationship between the level of lethal 
violence employed by police officers and the threat levels experienced in different 
environments.  
 
Comparing the lethality of police use of force 
 
Philippine police reports on armed encounters uniformly state that the suspects shot 
first. If this were the case, it would be sensible to assume that police officers should also 
have been wounded or killed. Further, if the aim was to incapacitate the suspects, more 
suspects should have been wounded than killed. However, for the whole sample, the 
ratio of suspects killed to police officers killed stands at 36.2, meaning that 36 suspects 
were killed for each police officer on average during the decade from 2006 to 2015. 
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Once again, ratios vary widely with an extreme level of 146 for Bulacan in Region 3, 
with 98 for Rizal and 89 for Cavite (Region 4a). On the other hand, for several 
administrative units neither suspects nor police officers were reported killed for the 
whole decade (Pateros, San Juan, Marinduque, Occ Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, 
Siquijor, Bukidnon, Camiguin, Misamis Occidental).  
A glimpse at the other “top scorers” in fatal police violence shows how striking 
the Philippine ratios cited in the previous paragraph are. For the United States the 
respective ratio for the decade from 2006 to 2015 is 18. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, a city 
that is notorious for excessive police violence against suspected criminals had a ratio of 
23.3 suspects killed for every police officer killed for the period from 2010 to 2014 (AI 
2015, 34-35). In Jamaica, the police killed approximately 200 civilians while 13 police 
officers were killed per year between 2003 and 2011, which yields a ratio of 15.4 (The 
Gleaner 2017). A recent analysis of police killings in Mexico showed ratios between 1.1 
and 10.4 for the period between 2008 and 2014 (Correa, Forné and Rivas 2015).  
Thus, the overall rate of 36.2 suspects killed for each police officer exceeds by 
far the extreme cases of Rio de Janeiro and Mexico. This is all the more surprising, as 
the decade from 2006 to 2015 saw neither a “war against drugs” nor an iron-fisted 
policy that typically result in a large number of armed confrontations and deaths. This 
clearly signals a disproportionate use of deadly violence in relation to a relatively small 
threat before Duterte. 
This analysis is strongly underlined by taking the number of wounded suspects 
into account. Put simply, when PNP officers engaged in armed encounters, they almost 
without exception shot to kill, not merely to incapacitate the suspects. Whereas 1,612 
suspects were reportedly killed, only 86 were wounded – i.e., for each person wounded, 
nearly 19 suspects were killed. In a number of regions the reported survival rate was 
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zero, such as in Tarlac with 46 and Rizal with 98 suspects killed but none reported 
wounded.  
While international comparisons are hard to come by, at least four exist – 
Jamaica, Chicago and Philadelphia and Mexico. In Mexico, the ratio of suspects killed 
to suspects wounded stood at seven on average for the Mexican Federal Police and at 
eight for the army units engaged in the war against drugs (Correa, Forné and Rivas 
2015); this means seven to eight suspects were killed for each suspect wounded. In 
Jamaica the police killed 1422 and wounded 1,115 persons from 2000 to 2007 in armed 
engagements (ratio: 1.27) (AI 2008, 22). Police in Chicago were involved in 435 
shooting incidents between 2010 and 2015 resulting in 92 people killed and 170 
wounded by the police, (ratio: 0.54) (Richards et al., 2016). In Philadelphia, police 
injured 47% of suspects and killed 23% while 30% were not injured in 364 encounters 
from 2007 to 2013 (Fachner and Carter 2015, 29). This means that of all those hit by 
police bullets approximately two-thirds survived (ratio: 0.49). Thus, all other cases – 
even that of Mexico – pale in comparison with the Philippine ratio of suspects killed to 
wounded. 
 
Armed police encounters (2006–2015): Stability and change within regions 
and sub-regional units over time 
 
Until this point, the analysis has been “spatial,” involving comparisons between 
regional and sub-regional units, but without regard to changes over time. This image of 
rather stable (sub-)regional units that represent either high or low police violence will 
now be dissected to establish the extent and the patterns of temporal variation.  
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A temporal analysis of the complete sample of provinces and cities reveals a stunning 
result. First, lethal police violence is “wave-like,” with strong distinct amplitudes and 
low points that almost perfectly correspond to the Philippine electoral cycle (see figure 
5). Put simply, election years (2007, 2010, 2013) are characterised by extraordinarily 
low levels of police violence but rises sharply during the non-election years. Second, 
this wave-like pattern is superimposed on a strong rise of about 120% in 10 years from 
90 to 199 suspects killed by the police per year.  
These dramatic fluctuations indicate that lethal police violence can to a certain 
extent be controlled as seems to have been generally done during election years, when 
the police were kept busy thwarting election violence.  
The slow but continuing rise in fatal police violence strongly suggests that the 
rash of killings by the police under Duterte was preceded by consistent changes in 
police practice during a period when the targeted killing of suspects did not yet receive 
official support from the highest political circles.  
 
CONCLUSION: FATAL POLICE VIOLENCE BEFORE DUTERTE  
 
The detailed mapping of Philippine police violence for the decade from 2006 to 2015 
established significant new knowledge about its extent and its special and temporal 
variation.  
It showed that Philippine fatal police violence stood at approximately the level 
of the United States during the past decade. While this is a fairly high level, it is well 
below the numbers that are “normal” for Brazil or Jamaica. Cause for concern is that 
during this decade the level of lethal police violence rose by more than 100%, clearly 
indicating a shift for the worse that preceded the Duterte campaign.  
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Lethal violence was spread highly unevenly. This variation is in no way related 
to local variations in fatal crime or numbers of police officers killed; in other words, it 
cannot be attributed to differences in threat perceived by police officers assigned to 
more or less dangerous environments.  
Even though the magnitude of lethal police violence was far from remarkable, 
lethality levels clearly were. Lethality rates in many of the Philippine regions analysed 
dwarfed those for globally notorious hotspots for which data are available. This allows 
only one conclusion: in these regions, the targeted killing of suspects was already an 
established policy before Duterte, albeit used only “sparingly.” 
The rather wide-ranging spatial and temporal differences suggest that general 
explanations such as, for example, organisational culture, cultural legitimacy or high 
levels of criminalisation of the police force are partial explanations at best.  
Regional and temporal variations suggest that the appropriate level for analysing 
the phenomenon of police encounters in the Philippines is the sub-regional level (that is, 
provincial, city). The data strongly indicate the need for detailed assessment and 
comparison of relevant practices at the local level.  
Given that election years have been crucial turning points in lethal police 
violence in several sub-regional units, the detailed analysis of the roles played by the 
local chief executives as actors who either inhibit or amplify lethal police-encounter 
violence is an obvious sequel to the present study. Such research could build on and link 
with analyses of the role of coercion in Philippine politics (Sidel 1999, Kreuzer 2012). 
It could also draw on studies of death squads (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 
1988; Alston 2008; HRW 2009). Throughout, these studies implicate deliberate 
decisions of municipal or provincial chief executives as drivers triggering, controlling 
and terminating political violence. It stands to reason that actors who in the past chose 
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to initiate and support deaths squads will opt for a legalisation of such types of crime-
control vigilantism that allows them to publicly take the credit for the campaigns’ 
“success.”  
While recourse to prominent cases is a reasonable entry point for analysis, it is 
of crucial importance to understand what makes them stand out and to give equal 
attention to sub-national units where fatal police violence was and is low or absent, and 
to also include cases where levels of violence have shifted significantly over time. Only 
in this way is it possible to arrive at empirically saturated comparisons that are also able 
to explain sub-national variation. Only in this way can we arrive at explanations for 
police officers’ decisions to shoot to kill that are not undermined by the wide array of 
spatial and temporal variation.  
The lack of government information on the extent and patterns of armed police 
encounters are no excuse for the almost complete absence of such detailed research on 
this phenomenon in the Philippines and beyond. There are sufficient alternative 
methods for establishing the necessary datasets that allow scientifically sound 
assessments of the respective patterns and for sub-national and international 
comparisons.  
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Supplemental Data 
 
Supplemental data for this commentary can be accessed here 
[https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8JXQCG]. The electronic supplement includes all raw 
data on the numbers of encounters, of suspects killed and wounded as well as on police-
officers killed and wounded during “legitimate encounters” in the National Capital 
Region, Regions 3, 4a, 4b, 7 and 10. It also provides additional information on the 
coding and an estimate of the accuracy of the data as well as a complete list of the 
online-sources from which the information were culled .  
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1 Whereas the United States has been the “top-scorer” with respect to fatal police 
violence among the 20 most developed nations (based on the human development 
index) for the past decade, Brazil and Jamaica have longstanding records of 
extreme police violence on a global scale. In recent years, police violence in 
Mexico has risen dramatically in the context of the government’s war on drugs. 
 
2 In order to calculate the rates for the various indicators several further datasets on 
population, crime levels and strength of the police force were established. 
Population data for the sub-regional units were calculated on the basis of the 2000, 
2010 and 2015 censuses. The respective regional data on criminal killings (both 
murder and homicide) were drawn from monthly reports posted online by the 
Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management (DIDM), the Philippine 
National Police (PNP) and the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) 
plus the Economic and Social Database of the Philippine Institute for Development 
Studies (PIDS) for the years 2006 to 2013, most of which are no longer available 
online. Information on the strength of the police forces at the regional level is 
derived from the Philippine Statistics Authority (2012), which, however, only 
provides data for 2011. This has been supplemented with the relevant data for the 
sub-sample of NCR component units for the years 2011 to 2015 from the National 
Competitiveness Council (n.d.). 
 
3 Regional data are only available for the years 2006 to 2014. The year 2015 was 
computed by adding the numbers for numerical values for the two preceding years 
and dividing by 2. 
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Tables and Figures for Kreuzer: Excessive Use of Deadly Force by Police in the 
Philippines before Duterte 
 
 
Table 1. Indicators for establishing the presence and severity of police vigilantism 
 
Magnitude of deadly police 
violence 
Absolute magnitude of 
police killings 
 suspects killed
million population
 
Relative magnitude of 
police killings in relation to 
perceived abstract threat 
suspects killed
criminal killings
 
Threat level experienced by 
police officers Abstract threat 
criminal killings
million population
 
Concrete threat 
police officers killed
police force
 
Lethality of police violence Lethality as reaction to 
perceived direct threat 
suspects killed
police officers killed
 
Lethality as expression of 
will to kill  
 suspects killed
 suspects wounded
 
 
 
Table 2. Regional profiles of armed encounters from 2006 to 2015 
 
  Suspects as victims Police officers as 
victims 
Region Encounters Killed Wounded Killed Wounded 
NCR 505 857 43 19 48 
Reg. 3 154 323 18 2 4 
Reg. 4a 152 338 12 13 16 
Reg.4b 1 2 0 1 0 
Reg. 7  68 90 13 5 19 
Reg 10 2 2 0 0 2 
Total 882 1612 86 40 89 
 
Source: own dataset 
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Table 3. Suspects killed per million population per year (2006–2015) 
 
NCR 7.17   Region 4a 2.65 
Caloocan 3.1   Batangas 1.01 
Las Pinas 2.52   Cavite 2.88 
Makati 3.53   Laguna 3.78 
Malabon 3.09   Quezon 1.31 
Mandaluyong 4.11   Rizal 3.94 
Manila 14.44   Reg 4b 0.07 
Marikina 2.57   Marinduque 0 
Muntinlupa 3.87   Occ Mindoro 0 
Navotas 5.26   Or Mindoro 0.25 
Paranaque 2.01   Palawan 0 
Pasay 5.55   Romblon 0 
Pasig 1.18   Reg 7  1.3  
Pateros  0   Cebu  1.42 
Quezon City 14.49   Bohol 1.63 
San Juan  0   Siquijor 0 
Taguig 2.68   Negros Or 0.62  
Valencuela 3.8   Reg 10 0.05 
Reg 3 3.15   Bukidnon 0 
Aurora 0.5   Camiguin 0 
Bataan 1.75   Lanao del Norte  0.11 
Bulacan 4.99   Misamis Occ 0 
Nueva Ecija 2.76   Misamis Or 0.07 
Pampanga 2.31    
Tarlac  3.61    
Zambales 1.32    
 
Source: own dataset. 
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Table 4. The relation between suspects killed by the police and criminal killings 
2006-2015 (%) 
 
Region 
Suspects 
killed 
Criminal 
killings 
Suspects killed/ 
criminal killings 
NCR 857 10,977 7.81 
3 323 9,040 3.57 
4a 338 15,776 2.14 
4b 2 3,239 0.06 
7 90 10,069 0.89 
10 2 7,813 0.03 
Total  1,612 43,126 3.74 
 
Sources: own dataset, DIDM, CIDG, PNP 
 
 
Table 5. Murder and homicide compared with suspects killed per million 
population per year 2006-2015 
 
 NCR Reg. 3 Reg. 4a Reg. 4b Reg. 7 Reg. 10 
Criminal killings 91.9 88.3 123.6 117.4 180.9 180.7 
Suspects killed 7.2 3.2 2.6 0.07 1.3 0.05 
 
Sources: DIDM, CIDG, PNP; PSA, own calculations  
 
 
Table 6. Police officers killed per year in percent of police force 2006-2015 
 
 NCR 3 4A 4b 7 10 
Total 
average 
Police officers 
killed /Police force 
strength  
0.016 0.002 0.13 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.009 
 
Source: own dataset, PSA 2012 
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Figure 1. Police officers killed as a percentage of police force in relation to suspects 
killed per million population in the NCR per year, 2006-2015 
 
 
 
Sources: own dataset, National Competitiveness Council [no date] 
 
 
Figure 2. Number of suspects killed by police 2006-2015 
 
 
 
Source: own dataset 
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